Article
Amanda B. Hurst
This Symposium, The Art of Judging, delved into the complexity of the judicial craft, discussing the intellectual, practical, and human dimensions of judicial work. The Symposium addressed courtroom management, decision-making, and opinion writing, as well as the impact of evolving technologies on these core judicial functions. Another key focus was the increasing challenges judges face in responding to litigants’ wellness issues, managing their own well-being, and maintaining the judicial persona—both inside and outside the courtroom. Though the Symposium was not born out of the aim of combating the current climate, where misinformation and misunderstanding of the judicial role threaten judicial legitimacy and even safety, such concerns ramped up during the planning phase, and the Symposium took place amid a critical period in the life of the judiciary. Thus, addressing these attacks evolved into a core concern of the Symposium, such that every speaker, panel, and piece in this issue, either explicitly or implicitly, offers a prescription for stemming the tide.
Article
Steve Leben
Courts derive authority not only from reaching correct outcomes but also from public acceptance of their legitimacy, which must be earned case by case through both sound decisions and the visible exercise of authority. Procedural-justice research shows that people are more likely to accept even unfavorable rulings when courts provide voice, neutrality, respect, and evidence of trustworthy motives. Yet legitimacy also depends on decision quality, and judicial judgment, like all human judgment, is vulnerable to overconfidence, framing effects, motivated reasoning, and unwanted variability or “noise.” This Article argues that intellectual humility can connect these concerns. Intellectual humility means recognizing that one’s knowledge may be incomplete and conclusions fallible while remaining disciplined and open to contrary reasons and evidence. Parts II–IV summarize the procedural-justice, decision-science, and intellectual-humility literatures as they apply to courts. Part V integrates them into an “Intellectual Humility by Design” model for trial courts, appellate courts, chambers, and court administration, treating reasons and explanations as the bridge between decision quality and legitimacy. Part VI offers practical tools, adoption strategies, measurement approaches, and limitations. The goal is an evidence-informed framework for improving judicial reliability and earning public legitimacy through routines that are realistic, teachable, and durable.
Article
Gerald Lebovitz
In a 1947 article in the Arkansas Law Review, Judge George Rose Smith called the scarcity of guidance on the mechanics of judicial opinion writing a “striking omission in legal literature,” and he was right. Judges devote much of their work to decisions that resolve disputes, define rights and responsibilities, and establish precedent, yet legal scholarship has often neglected the fundamental questions of how judges should decide cases, justify their conclusions, and persuade readers that those conclusions are correct. Because writing an opinion requires a judge to defend the decision publicly, this Article examines strategies, styles, and practical tools that can make judicial opinions more persuasive. It does not claim that there is a single best method, because no universally accepted model exists; instead, it evaluates the stylistic choices available to judges and explains how each may strengthen or weaken an opinion’s persuasive force. Building on Judge Smith’s pioneering work in judicial rhetoric and opinion writing, the Article seeks to encourage judges to pursue improvement in this essential aspect of judging with some measure of the grace, humility, and wit that distinguished his 1947, 1967, and 1973 primers.
Article
Alistair Newbern
Recent headlines have highlighted two related threats to the federal judiciary: declining public trust and increasing dangers to judges’ personal safety. Public opinion of the Supreme Court fell to nearly a three-decade low in 2025, while confidence in the federal judiciary reached a record-low 35 percent in 2024. In his 2024 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts identified four forms of “illegitimate activity” that threaten judicial independence and the rule of law: violence, intimidation, disinformation, and defiance of lawfully entered judgments. He expressed particular concern about disinformation—the distortion of a ruling’s factual or legal basis—which can undermine confidence in the courts. Roberts warned that hostile foreign actors increasingly use bots and social media to circulate false or exaggerated accounts of judicial decisions, foment political discord, and compromise public confidence in judicial processes and outcomes. He therefore urged the nation to publicize these risks and take appropriate measures to stop them. The critical question, however, is what measures judges themselves can take to restore public confidence in the judiciary.
Article
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich
Society expects judges to apply law to facts logically and consistently, but human judgment does not operate as a purely deductive process. Decades of research show that people often rely on mental shortcuts that are efficient and useful but may depart from formal logic, especially when applied in the wrong context. Decision-making therefore reflects a combination of intuitive judgments, which can mislead, and deliberate reasoning, which may correct them. Judges are no exception: research by the authors and others demonstrates that judges use cognitive strategies that can distort decisions even in legal settings. One prominent example is “anchoring,” the tendency to rely too heavily on an initial numerical reference point when making a numerical judgment. Anchoring is especially troubling because its effects are pervasive, powerful, and sometimes dramatic. This Article examines the depth of judges’ vulnerability to anchoring by reporting an experiment in which 563 judges from multiple jurisdictions were exposed to a plainly irrelevant numerical anchor—a street address. The results show that even this absurd reference point influenced their judgments. Although the authors have previously documented anchoring among judges, this study demonstrates just how deeply that cognitive vulnerability can affect judicial decision-making.
Comment
Emilee Webb
Since 2019, approximately 7,000 pharmacies—both independent stores and major chains—have closed across the United States, contributing to “pharmacy deserts,” or areas where consumers lack reasonable access to pharmacy services. Although commonly defined by distance—more than one mile in urban areas, two miles in suburban areas, or ten miles in rural areas—pharmacy deserts may also result from limited operating hours, inadequate public transportation, low income, or mobility challenges. Their consequences include reduced access to vaccines and preventive care, medication nonadherence, higher healthcare costs, missed work, diminished control over healthcare decisions, and broader health-equity concerns. Arkansas has lost about 100 pharmacies since 2020, including a Dumas pharmacy that had operated since 1917, and rural closures have been linked to pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”), which influence drug distribution, access, pricing, and pharmacy reimbursement rates. In response to claims that PBMs reimburse local pharmacies at unsustainably low rates, Arkansas enacted Act 624 to restrict PBM ownership of pharmacies and protect rural access. Yet the law could have the opposite effect by forcing PBM-owned pharmacies to close, potentially including all twenty-three CVS locations in Arkansas, disrupting prescription access for approximately 340,000 consumers and worsening the state’s pharmacy-desert problem.
Comment
Stephen H. Jacobs