Article
Jeffrey A. Parness
This Article explores the evaporating Due Process interests of natural childcare parents who are not unfit and who do not knowingly consent to diminished childcare liberties when the state recognizes new nonadoptive and nonbiological parents. Childcare liberty losses need not involve neglect or comparable bad acts rendering a parent unfit. They need not involve consent, actual or implied, by an adversely affected parent. On the new forms of nonadoptive and nonbiological childcare parents, the most recent UPAs and their state counterparts are illustrative. They recognize parentage in an individual who resides with and holds out a child as the individual’s own “for the first two years of the life of the child.” That individual can effectively replace a fit, existing, and nonconsenting parent by judicial decree. Comparably, the 2017 UPA recognizes that a de facto parent, without adoptive or biological ties, can then replace an existing fit parent. Further, nonadoptive and nonbiological parents can also effectively displace natural parents via new forms of voluntary parentage acknowledgments. This Article also explores Due Process liberty issues arising with the new forms of parentage under the United States Supreme Court decision in Lehr v. Robertson. There, as noted, the Court recognized that a “natural father [has] an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.”
Article
Jeffery L. Rensberger
In personal jurisdiction, an intellectual siloing has prevented some courts from using a basis of jurisdiction over individuals that is available for corporations. This Article explores this question. Jurisdiction in such a case turns on whether general jurisdiction based on a large number of unrelated contacts--contacts-based general jurisdiction--applies to individuals as well as to corporations. The short answer is that despite hesitancy in the cases, such jurisdiction has historically been invoked and this is a correct result as a matter of due process doctrine. One aim of this Article is to dispel the doubt on this point that unnecessarily persists. A second question is how the test of Daimler applies to individuals. Third, one may wonder about this question’s practical importance. Given the availability of specific jurisdiction in the place where the events giving rise to the litigation occurred and general jurisdiction both where the defendant is domiciled and where he or she might be served with process, when is an additional place of jurisdiction useful?
Comment
Ilse Ghent
From the time of the Revolutionary War, United States citizens have prioritized one thing over almost everything else: that “a man’s house is his castle.” This is immortalized in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable and warrantless searches. The protections granted by the Fourth Amendment are not centered around the rights a person has in their property. Instead, “the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” This protection is so important that the Supreme Court has been explicitly clear that warrantless searches should only be permitted in the most “exceptional” of circumstances. One way in which Fourth Amendment protections have been diminished is through the broad application of the “vehicle exception” to warrant requirements. At its inception, the vehicle exception applied only to traditional vehicles. However, as time went on, states did not uniformly apply the vehicle exception and were specifically divided regarding whether the exception should apply to motor homes.
Comment
Lindsay Mast
Charlie Vaughn has been incarcerated since 1991 in Arkansas’s Tucker Unit maximum security prison, serving a life sentence for a first-degree murder he did not commit. His actual innocence is simply irrelevant in the State of Arkansas due to strict adherence to procedural court filing rules. He has only been denied without opinion or procedurally barred. Despite both state and federal constitutional protections safeguarding liberty and freedom through various rights, including to counsel, to remain silent, a speedy trial, a jury of peers, and due process, wrongful convictions persist. Arkansas stands out among other top incarceration rate states as one where notably few exonerations have occurred. A closer look at the stringent limitations and practical implications of the state’s primary post1conviction remedy, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 (“Rule 37”), reveals that very few inmates with innocence claims ever receive a review of their case on the merits because their claims are often procedurally barred just ninety days into incarceration. This Comment begins with Charlie Vaughn’s story, followed by an overview of how a defendant progresses through Arkansas courts after being found guilty of a felony, providing a past to present overview of collateral post-conviction remedies available. Part II focuses on analyzing the practical implications of Rule 37, the primary state remedy available to wrongfully convicted defendants seeking to overturn their original conviction. Part III concludes with specific recommendations for achieving stated goals of the state in post-conviction relief remedies while defending life and liberty as guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.
Comment
Christopher Piel
“They eat what they kill.” Dana White, President of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) said this about the state of fighter pay in the organization. White, the voice of the company, holds firm that fighters are adequately compensated for their services. The reality is that UFC fighters are not paid what they deserve, and, one way or another, there are big changes coming to the organization and the sport of Mixed Martial Arts (“MMA”) as a whole. In this Comment, I will discuss how the UFC has used its market power to suppress fighters’ wages and subject fighters to inequitable contract provisions. Further, I will argue that major changes are coming to the MMA industry and explore the UFC’s options in facilitating those changes. Finally, I will propose that a UFC fighter’s union is the best way to resolve the organization’s current mistreatment of their own athletes while still protecting the interests of the fans and the UFC itself. In Part I, I will discuss the origins of the UFC and its rise to market dominance in the MMA industry, and I will explain how the modern UFC’s status in the sport creates legal issues for the company. In Part II, I will discuss the two primary potential solutions to the UFC’s current legal issues and evaluate each of those solutions from the perspective of the UFC, the fighters, and the fans.
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